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ABSTRACT
Memory errors continue to compromise the security of today’s
systems. Recent efforts to automatically synthesize exploits for
stack-based buffer overflows promise to help assess a vulnerabil-
ity’s severity more quickly and alleviate the burden of manual
reasoning. However, generation of heap exploits has been out of
scope for such methods thus far. In this paper, we investigate the
problem of automatically generating heap exploits, which, in addi-
tion to finding the vulnerability, requires intricate interaction with
the heap manager. We identify the challenges involved in automat-
ically finding the right parameters and interaction sequences for
such attacks, which have traditionally required manual analysis.
To tackle these challenges, we present a modular approach that is
designed to minimize the assumptions made about the heap man-
ager used by the target application. Our prototype system is able to
find exploit primitives in six binary implementations of Windows
and UNIX-based heap managers and applies these to successfully
exploit two real-world applications.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Vulnerability management; Soft-
ware and application security;
KEYWORDS
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1 INTRODUCTION
Programming errors that allow the corruption of critical portions
of program memory, such as stack and heap buffer overflows, re-
main a prevalent problem [24, 26]. An attacker can exploit such
vulnerabilities and inject new code to be executed or re-use existing
code for malicious purposes. Even though many modern program-
ming languages are memory safe and rule out such risks by design,
unsafe low-level languages, such as C and C++, continue to be
popular. This is driven not only by large amounts of legacy code,
but also performance requirements and the resource constraints of
embedded environments.
Buffer overflows on the stack are well-studied and have a long
history of being exploited. The basic strategy is to overflow a local
buffer on the stack with input data until it overwrites a code pointer
(typically the return address). An arms race of ever-more sophis-
ticated defenses and attacks has lead to stack exploits becoming
increasingly difficult to execute against hardened programs [24].
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Tools for automated exploit generation are designed to find stack-
based vulnerabilities and automatically construct customized ex-
ploits [2, 4, 6, 16]. While the appeal of such tools to potential attack-
ers seems obvious, they actually offer a powerful pro-active defense
strategy in the form of an automated penetration tester. Using these
tools, developers can attempt to exploit their own systems at low
cost. Furthermore, by seeding an exploit generator with a reported
bug, developers can automatically assess the bug’s exploitability
and prioritize its patching accordingly.
Attacks against the heap are considerably more difficult than
stack-based exploits. They are based on overflowing a dynamically
allocated buffer and overwriting metadata, which causes subse-
quent operations of the heap manager (such as free) to violate
security assumptions. For example, by writing attacker-controlled
data to an attacker-controlled location. Just like stack-based buffer
overflows, heap attacks require a programming error, such as a
missing bounds check in the target application, which introduces
the vulnerability in the first place. In addition, however, setting up
the attack correctly requires intricate knowledge of the structure of
heap metadata and the internal state of the heap manager; without
it, the program will likely crash without executing any attacker-
controlled code. Akin to the arms race in stack exploits, modern
developments in hardening heap managers against common exploit
techniques have made this type of attack even more complex [20],
but still feasible.
So far, the task of crafting exploits for the heap–even for classic
vulnerabilities in systems like Windows XP—still lies firmly in the
realm of manual analysis. Despite similarities to stack-based exploit
generation (e.g., the requirement of an overflow-type vulnerability),
the absence of automatic techniques for heap exploits suggests that
heap-specific challenges are fundamentally difficult to overcome.
In this paper, we focus on the key differences between stack-based
and heap-based exploit generation. Existing approaches for finding
the initial overflow vulnerability can be fully reused; what differs
is the search for a feasible exploit, given an existing vulnerability.
We make the following contributions:
• We introduce heap-based vulnerabilities, in particular, the
classic unsafe unlinking vulnerability, in the context of the
automatic exploit generation problem. We explain the key
challenges of the problem and analyze the steps required for
any successful exploit in this class of attacks (§3).
• We propose a modular approach based on symbolic execu-
tion to automatically find (i) reusable attack patterns against
heap managers and (ii) instances of these patterns in real-
world applications (§4).
• We demonstrate our approach using a prototype implemen-
tation (§5) and present a series of experiments where we
generate working exploits for binaries of both closed- and
open-source heap managers and applications (§6).
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Figure 1: Memory layout of the free chunk header on the
Windows heap (32 bit system). Each box corresponds to one
byte.
2 BACKGROUND
We now first briefly recall the functionality and concepts behind
heap memory management (§2.1) and then provide the basics of
symbolic execution, the program analysis technique that underlies
our approach (§2.2).
2.1 Heap Memory Management
The heap memory manager is the system component responsible
for the provision, organization, and optimization of dynamically
allocated memory. At runtime, applications request memory from
the heap manager using calls such as malloc() or HeapAlloc().
The heap manager maintains a list of free memory chunks and,
upon receiving a request for memory of a particular size, it searches
that list for a chunk greater than or equal to that requested by the
client application. It is the application’s responsibility to respect
the boundaries of the memory chunk and to eventually release it
by calling free() or HeapFree().
Freelists. Different heap managers select different locations for
storing heap metadata. Many popular heap managers, including
the default Windows heap manager [17] and Linux’s dlmalloc or
ptmalloc2 [10], employ freelist-based memory management. In
this model, the heap manager prefixes a memory chunk with heap
metadata (a header) that describes attributes such as the flags and
size of the chunk. This results in a heap layout where memory
chunks containing application data are intermixed with heap meta-
data. If an application inadvertently permits user data to be written
past the boundaries of the allocated chunk, then there is a good
chance of user input overwriting adjacent heap metadata.
If a memory chunk is not allocated, then its header forms part
of the freelists and contains both a forward (fd) and backward (bk)
pointer to the next and previous free chunk, respectively. These
headers are traversed by the heap manager while it searches for
suitable chunks during memory allocation. Other operating sys-
tems, for example, FreeBSD and OpenBSD, use BiBoP memory
managers [3], which align allocations to page boundaries and store
metadata at the start of a page.
Windows XP Heap. In Windows XP, applications dynamically
allocate memory via userspace API functions in kernel32.dll,
such as HeapAlloc and HeapFree, which in turn forward the re-
quests to API functions like RtlAllocateHeap of theHeapManager
residing in ntdll.dll. The heap manager is divided into a high-
performance front-end manager, utilizing lookaside lists and the
/* Take a chunk off a bin list */
#define unlink(P, BK, FD) { \
FD = P->fd; \
BK = P->bk; \
FD->bk = BK; \
BK->fd = FD; \
}
Figure 2: The unlinkmacro from glibc 2.3.3.
low fragmentation heap, and a robust, general-purpose back-end
manager, utilizing freelists and the heap cache [20, 25]. The purpose
of both is to minimize the amount of requests for large memory
blocks that must be forwarded to the operating system’s virtual
memory manager (VMM).
The Heap Manager divides blocks acquired from the VMM into
smaller, re-usable chunks. The heap chunk header is 16 bytes in size
(see Figure 1). The first 8 bytes, containing the chunk size and flags,
are present in every header type, including busy chunks, but the
fd and bk pointers are only present in free chunks of memory. The
back-end heap manager maintains several circular doubly-linked
lists (FreeList[0] – FreeList[128]) to keep track of free memory
chunks in any particular heap. When the client application calls
HeapAlloc, the heap manager searches the freelists; if it finds a
suitable chunk (equal to or greater than in size than was requested),
the heap manager unlinks the chunk from a FreeList and returns it
to the client application.
Windows versions up to XP Service Pack 1 implement the unlink-
ing of a free chunk header Pwithout any sanity checks in essentially
the same way as the multi-line macro in Figure 2, which is found
in the source code to ptmalloc in the GNU C library 2.3.3. Note
that ptmalloc uses fd and bk in place of flink and blink for the
list pointers. Arguments BK and FD are used as temporary storage.
Unsafe Unlinking Exploit Primitive. An attacker who controls
P->fd and P->bk can choose their values to trigger a write of an
arbitrary value to an arbitrary memory location. The line FD->bk =
BKwill write the value in P->bk to the address computed as the sum
of P->fd and the offset of the bk field in the enclosing list struct, i.e.,
(p->fd)->bk = p->bk, in expanded form. The second write access
to BK->fd then reverses the roles of the values; its values depend
directly on the ones chosen for the first write and can trigger an
access violation if not chosen carefully (this is a typical challenge
for writing working heap exploits).
Such elementarywrite-anything-anywhere operations have been
dubbed exploit primitives, since they serve as building blocks in a
chain of primitives used to achieve arbitrary code execution. There
are a number of other common heap-management operations, such
as the coalescing of two adjacent free chunks into a single large
chunk of memory, that may give rise to exploit primitives if heap
metadata is corrupted and not verified.
Windows versions beginning with XP Service Pack 2 (SP2) have
added two sanity checks to the unlinkmacro that use the data struc-
ture invariants of the circular doubly-linked freelist (node->bk->fd
== node and node->fd->bk == node) to verify the list’s local in-
tegrity before executing a write.
Lookaside List Exploit Primitive. Singly-linked lists, such as the
lightweight lookaside lists in the Windows heap manager, do not
allow to implement such a simple invariant check. Thus, versions
up to Windows 2003 Server remain vulnerable via their lookaside
lists even though the exploit primitive in the unlink operation was
removed.
The lookaside list can be exploited by corrupting heap metadata
such that an attacker-chosen pointer is eventually inserted into the
list. Once HeapAlloc returns an entry from the lookaside list to
the application, any write to that pointer by the application targets
attacker-chosen memory. If the data written is also attacker-chosen,
then the attacker has again found an exploit primitive.
2.2 Symbolic Execution
Symbolic execution is a technique for the systematic enumeration of
program paths, and it has been highly successful in automated test
case generation [5, 7, 13, 14]. In symbolic execution, inputs to the
program under test are given symbolic instead of concrete values.
Whenever a symbolic input variable is used in a conditional state-
ment, execution forks and follows both branches. During execution,
the conditional expressions on branches are added as conjunctions
to the path condition. The path condition expresses the condition
over input variables under which that path is taken. Whenever a
path forks into two, the symbolic execution engine can rule out
infeasible paths by calling a constraint solver to check whether both
or just one of the resulting path conditions is satisfiable. Symbolic
execution is sound, since all the paths it explores are also feasible
in real executions.
In principle, a symbolic execution engine eventually explores
all control flow paths in a target program; symbolic execution is
theoretically complete. In practice, the exponential growth in the
number of paths limits the amount of exploration that an engine
can achieve. Many symbolic execution engines furthermore forego
completeness by sometimes concretizing parts of the symbolic state
space. For instance, when external functions are called, parameters
whose value depends on symbolic input can be fixed to a single
concrete value to rule out any forking in the callee.
Automatically generating exploits is in many ways similar to
generating a test case exhibiting a particular bug. Therefore, sym-
bolic execution is well-suited as a foundation for this task. Prior
work on automatic exploit generation has either built directly on
symbolic execution [2, 4, 6], or closely related techniques such
as bounded model checking [16]. Many challenges that exploit-
generation systems encounter in practice, e.g., path explosion, are
also largely shared with symbolic execution. For the purpose of
this paper, we treat this problem as orthogonal, but acknowledge
that it is an active area of ongoing research.
Path explosion (or, equivalently, state space explosion) describes
the problem arising from the fact that, in general, the number of
program paths is exponential in the size of the program. Many tech-
niques have been proposed to cope with path explosion, including
search strategies that prioritize important paths [5], function sum-
maries [12], and state merging, which tries to reduce the number
of paths by combining states using disjunctions [18].
Interactions with the environment increase the difficulty of ex-
ercising accurate behavior in the program under test. Tools such
as KLEE [5] are equipped with a handful of system call models
that abstract and imitate the application-system interaction. Unlike
KLEE, the S2E system [7] does not model the environment, but
instead provides a full operating system stack, composed of appli-
cations, system libraries, drivers and the kernel. If required, S2E
could explore the entire system symbolically, although in practice,
one typically chooses to run most of the system concretely while
just selectively enabling symbolic execution. The environment is
normally several orders of magnitude larger than the unit under
test and avoiding its exploration improves scalability.
3 AUTOMATIC HEAP EXPLOITATION
We now frame the problem of automatic heap exploitation (§3.1),
introduce our modular approach (§3.2), and illustrate its phases
following a practical example (§3.3).
3.1 Problem Definition
In the scope of this paper, we restrict ourselves to read and write
exploit primitives. Therefore, we define a heap vulnerability as an
application vulnerability that allows an attacker to manipulate heap
metadata into executing an exploit primitive for writing attacker-
controlled data to an attacker-controlled location. Our goal is to
design an algorithm that is complete (or as complete as possible)
for this subclass of heap-related vulnerabilities, and that reliably
finds and exploits write primitives in heap management code.
The problem of exploiting heap-based vulnerabilities differs from
that of exploiting stack-based or string-format vulnerabilities in
that it actually involves two separate targets: (i) the application
containing a heap-based buffer overflow and (ii) the heap manager
that mediates the memory allocations. Exploit primitives in heap
managers, e.g., write-4 or write-n for writing 4 or n bytes to an
arbitrary address, respectively, exist independently of application-
specific implementations. Thus, it suffices to locate a set of exploit
primitives once for each heap allocator. The exploit primitives
and often even the subsequent control-flow hijack parameters can
then be directly applied to different applications (given that non-
randomized code, such as trampoline offsets, remains constant in
shared modules such as kernel32.dll).
This modularity is a key aspect of our approach. For a given
heap manager, we first discover reusable exploit primitives in an
automatic process using a generic testing harness (the application
surrogate). For a given application and runtime environment, we
then use the matching primitives to automatically generate an
exploit for a heap-based vulnerability.
The contributions of our present work focus only on the specifics
of exploiting heap management code; we consider the general
search for application bugs (which could lead to vulnerabilities) as
an orthogonal problem. Indeed, existing powerful test case genera-
tion tools can provide input for our system, which then assumes
the role of classifying bugs according to their exploitability. This
approach is in line with previous work on exploit generation that
seeds its search with known crashing inputs [2, 16].
Modern exploit mitigation techniques such as Address Space
Layout Randomization (ASLR) [19] orW ⊕ X present further chal-
lenges that we consider out of scope for now. In addition to the path
77F52346 mov [ebp-C4h], eax
77F5234C L_unlink:
77F5234C mov [eax], ecx
77F5234E mov [ecx+04h], eax
77F52356 ...
Figure 3: A code segment with an exploit primitive.
condition for reaching an exploit primitive, such defense mecha-
nisms introduce additional constraints on the exploit solution (and
may render some vulnerabilities non-exploitable). A number of
techniques exist to circumvent known protections in many sce-
narios and may be applicable in the context of automatic exploit
generation [9, 22, 23].
3.2 Modular Exploit Generation
Overall, our approach to generating heap exploits follows a five-
phase process, of which the first two phases are always independent
of the target application, and the third and fourth can often be
kept independent. All phases rely on symbolically executing the
application program together with the heap management code. The
phases are:
(1) Interact: Find a crashing sequence of heap-interactions that
overwrites heap metadata and generate a surrogate program
that implements the sequence.
(2) Primitive: In the surrogate, fill the overflow buffer with
symbolic bytes to discover an exploit primitive in the heap
manager.
(3) Hijack: In either the heap manager or the target application,
locate a transfer of control flow to a memory pointer and im-
pose constraints on the symbolic input such that the exploit
primitive hijacks the pointer.
(4) Bounce: If necessary for control flow diversion, locate a
trampoline in library or application code that transfers con-
trol to attacker-controlled code.
(5) Payload: Synthesize the exploit payload and emit driver
code for feeding it to the application.
3.3 AlgorithmWalkthrough
We now present an example of applying the algorithm in order to
clarify the individual steps.
Enumerate Heap Interaction Patterns. The initial step (Interact)
entails finding a sequence of interactions between an application
and a heap manager that permits heap metadata to be sequentially
overwritten by a buffer overflow. As input, this phase uses an alpha-
bet of heap-management functions and buffer access and overflow
operators. Our system enumerates sequences until it finds one that
leads to the corruption of heap metadata and a subsequent crash,
e.g., (HeapCreate, HeapAlloc, HeapAlloc, Overflow, HeapAlloc).
Here, the trailing HeapAlloc call trusts the now-corrupted meta-
data and performs an unsafe unlink operation (see §2.1), causing
the subsequent execution of an exploit primitive. The crashing se-
quence is then cast into a surrogate program that acts as a test
harness for the heap manager.
77EB9B82 mov eax, [L77ED63B4]
77EB9B87 cmp eax, esi
77EB9B89 jz L77EB9BA0
77EB9B8B push edi
77EB9B8C call eax
Figure 4: The UEF exception handler dispatch.
The output of the Interact phase is a set of similar interaction
sequences that lead to exploit primitives and vulnerable heap layout
configurations for arbitrary heap managers.
Find Exploit Primitives. During the second phase (Primitive),
our system makes the overflowing bytes symbolic, because they
will be derived from input in a concrete attack. It then monitors
the program state for exploit primitives, which it detects as writes
of symbolic data to a symbolic address. This is synonymous with a
write of attacker data to an attacker-controlled location.
In our example, amemory copy instructionwith symbolic operands
is observed in ntdll.dll (see Figure 3). Both the EAX and ECX regis-
ters are symbolic and can be freely chosen by the attacker (modulo
the constraints imposed by the path condition).
At this point, our system has produced a path condition that
corresponds to a range of concrete inputs under which the target
program reaches an exploit primitive.
Control Flow Hijack. To achieve arbitrary code execution, the
exploit must divert the control flow of the application. In phase
Hijack, our system uses the exploit primitive to overwrite the
memory location that will be used for the next indirect control
transfer reachable from the exploit primitive.
Examples of exploitable indirect control transfers are function
pointers or installed exception handlers. In our example, the corrup-
tion of heap metadata causes a second exploit primitive to produce
an access violation in the heap manager and triggers a series of ex-
ception handlers. As Figure 4 shows, one of the exception handling
dispatch routines moves the value at memory address 77ED63B4
into EAX and calls it.
This memory address serves as the target for the exploit primitive
and completes the next step in the chain; by constraining EAX to be
equal to 77ED63B4when executing the mov [eax], ecx instruction
in Figure 3, control will eventually transfer to the location pointed
to by ECX.
Trampoline Search. To complete the exploit, we need to constrain
themanipulated jump target such that the program executes foreign
code, which, in our exploit model, is held in the attacker-controlled
overflow buffer. To make this control transfer reliable, Bounce
searches for a “trampoline”, another indirect control transfer, that
jumps to the address held in a register that happens to point to the
user-supplied buffer at the time.
Continuing our example, our system scans the processor state at
the time of the initial control flow hijack and finds that the registers
EDI and EBP point to our buffer. The system then searches for a
matching trampoline, i.e., call or jmp instructions to EDI/EBP+offset,
in any module loaded in the target process. This address completes
the next step; the ECX register has to be constrained to the trampo-
line memory address when the exploit primitive is executed.
Exploit Generation. The remaining phase, Payload, consists of
constructing a valid shellcode that satisfies the constraints imposed
on the buffer at the time of the trampoline jump. We use an elastic
shellcode template with NOP slides that can be adapted to satisfy
constraints. It is fitted with Service Pack-specific offsets to API
functions called from the shellcode. The exploit is expressed as
a C-based character array and also packaged into a stand-alone
executable Python script, selected according to the attack vector’s
method of delivery, e.g., over a network or the command line.
4 THE HEAP EXPLOIT SYNTHESIS CHAIN
We now present the details of our approach and explain the phases
for finding and satisfying the constraints under which the full chain
of events, necessary for the successful construction of an exploit,
unfolds. We discuss how to discover a vulnerable heap interaction
sequence (§4.1), locate a suitable exploit primitive (§4.2), hijack the
application control flow (§4.3), find a suitable trampoline (§4.4), and
synthesize the final exploit (§4.5).
4.1 Application-Heap Interaction
Given the implementation of an arbitrary heap manager H and its
API, the first phase (Interact) consists of searching for a sequence
of application-heap interactions that corrupts heap metadata and
violates the internal consistency of heap data structures. Once a
crashing sequence is found, it is written to a surrogate program,
which is then passed to the next phase, Primitive.
Successful sequences will typically contain (1) a call for creat-
ing a private heap (if necessary), (2) initial memory allocations to
generate metadata and a target memory buffer on the heap, (3)
an overflow θ to overwrite metadata, (4) an in-bounds write γ (if
necessary) and (5) a heap API call processing the invalid metadata
and triggering an exploit primitive. However, the exact sequence
and number of events that is required depends on the particular
heap manager. With this knowledge, it is possible to guide search
heuristics by prioritizing promising sequences of heap interactions.
This set of operations has so far been sufficient, but could in
principle be extended by other generic operations. While the API
calls and the overflow operator have obvious purposes, the need
for an in-bounds access is more subtle: depending on the type of
heap metadata corruption, an exploit primitive may only be reached
once the application executes a normal write (of attacker-controlled
or constant data) to a corrupted pointer, which has in turn been
inadvertently returned by a heap API function.
Interact begins by running an application surrogate that is an
interpreter for the alphabet
Σ = {Create, Alloc, Free,γ ,θ } ,
where Alloc and Free stand for malloc / HeapAlloc and free /
HeapFree, respectively, Create for the Windows-specific call to
HeapCreate, γ for an in-bounds buffer write, and θ for an out-of-
bounds heap overflow. The interpreter iterates over an input string,
interpreting symbols until it reaches the end and exits. For each
heap-management symbol, it executes the corresponding operation.
The input string can be fuzzed or symbolically executed up
to a fixed length (our prototype does the latter). With five sym-
bols in Σ, injecting a string of three characters results in a search
FreeList[0] Hn Dn Hn+1 Dn+1 Hn+2 Freen+2
Hn+2.blink
Hn+2.flink
Figure 5: Heap metadata is adjacent to buffer content.
space of 53 = 125 heap interactions. Crashes can be robustly
detected by interpreting signals (on Linux) or intercepting the
UnhandledExceptionFilter (on Windows).
Heap Configurations. In Windows heap management, after allo-
cation requests for memory of size Dn and Dn+1 bytes, and with
Freen+2 bytes remaining unallocated in the heap, the memory lay-
out will resemble that of Figure 5. Header Hn+2 references a free
block of memory and forms part of the FreeLists. If an application
permits buffer Dn+1 to be overflown (the overflow area is marked
in bold), then the flink and blink pointers in Hn+2 can be set to
arbitrary values. HeaderHn+2 points back to the FreeList[0] such
that a search for available memory terminates upon returning to the
beginning of the head node. In Figure 5, the heap is not fragmented
and coalescing is not required, so Hn+2 can summarize the en-
tirety of free memory available in the heap. Any further allocations
would split Freen+2 into Dn+2 and Freen+3, moving Hn+2’s flink
and blink pointers further towards the end of the heap. However, a
series of de-allocations could poke holes in consecutively allocated
memory and would result in a fragmented heap, with buffer Dn po-
tentially sitting next to new flink and blink pointers. The ability
to conduct more advanced manipulations of heap memory layouts
is desirable, because it can enable more surgical heap exploitation.
Limitations. In this work, we restrict our model to heap-based
buffer overflows that always overwrite heap metadata sequentially
by writing past the boundaries of allocated buffers. However, in
practice, there exist many methods for overwriting heap metadata.
For example, an integer arithmetic error in an array subscript could
directly corrupt heap metadata from any point in a program, while
leaving adjacent fields, such as heap header cookies, intact.
4.2 Heap Exploit Primitives
Given the heap manager H and a surrogate S implementing a
known-crashing interaction sequence, the next phase, Primitive,
discovers a set of heap exploit primitives P for overwriting security-
sensitive data in the application.
Figure 6 shows the set of exploit primitives with respect to sym-
bolic bytes. Mn [·] maps a memory address to its corresponding
n-byte value and x is an attacker-controlled symbolic value, which
may have arbitrary constraints imposed upon it. If only attacker-
specified input is made symbolic and critical operations eventually
manipulate symbolic bytes, then attacker input is reaching critical
Mn [c] ← x symbolic write-n to fixed location
Mn [x ] ← c fixed write-n to symbolic location
Mn [x ] ← x symbolic write-n to symbolic location
v ← Mn [x ] read-n from symbolic location
Figure 6: Description of heap exploit primitives.
if(!prev_inuse(p)) {
prevsize = p->prev_size;
size += prevsize;
p = chunk_at_offset(p, -prevsize);
unlink(p, bck, fwd);
}
Figure 7: Coalescing of chunks in dlmalloc.
operations under some constraints. The constraints determine the
level of control that the attacker exercises over the values used in
those critical operations. Hence, once a flow of symbolic data to a
symbolic destination is detected, we have discovered a heap exploit
primitive. Generally, we deal with full or partial write-n primitives
(for n = 1, 2, or 4 or a 32-bit system). Full write-n primitives give
the attacker control over both the data and the destination address,
whereas partial writes only allow the attacker to control one of
them.
Primitive involves injecting symbolic data past the boundaries
of allocated buffers, as per the application-heap interaction se-
quence determined in Interact, and repetitively picking new
paths to explore in surrogate S (see Algorithm 1). Each path is
executed, instruction by instruction, until program termination or
until an exploit primitive is found. If the instruction is of the form
I = (Mn [A] ← V ), such that a valueV is being written to memory
address A, and both A and V contain symbolic values, then the
instruction I is a write-n primitive.
The path is passed to the the next phase, Hijack, and execution
resumes from the instruction immediately following the exploit
primitive.
Read Primitives. Some heap managers, such as dlmalloc and
ptmalloc2, also require the use of read exploit primitives. Upon
overflowing the heap chunk header with symbolic bytes, field
p->prev_size becomes symbolic (see Figure 7) and the unlink
macro performs memory load operations from the symbolic ex-
pression. Depending on the memory model of the symbolic exe-
cution engine used, a symbolic read is either concretized or leads
to expensive subsequent solver queries involving array logic. We
use a concrete memory model, i.e., a symbolic expression must be
concretized before it is used as a pointer for a memory read. Concep-
tually, any feasible address is a possible solution; for completeness,
all possible addresses have to be eventually enumerated. We decide
to concretize symbolic reads to a memory address within bounds
of the attacker-controlled buffer, if possible. This follows a general
strategy of making symbolic as much as possible of the program
state. If the value chosen does not lead to a write primitive, the
current path terminates unsuccessfully and a new path is forked
with a new value. In the case of dlmalloc, the result is that the
Data: a surrogate S exercising a select sequence
Result: a tuple {Aval ,Vval} for exploit primitive
while (P = pickNewPath(S)) , ⊥ do
while (I = nextInstruct (P )) , ⊥ do
if (I =Mn [A] ← V ) then
if (A = sym) ∧ (V = sym) then
{Aval ,Ref } = Hijack (P , I);
Vval = Bounce (Ref );
ok = P.aC(A = Aval ,V = Vval);
if ok , ⊥ then
return {Aval ,Vval};
end
end
end
end
end
Algorithm 1: Discovering an exploit primitive.
unlink macro fetches symbolic bytes and ultimately executes a
write-4 exploit primitive as before.
4.3 Hijacking the Control Flow
Hijack addresses the problem of finding, given a set of exploit
primitives, a writable pointer T such that a single or a chain of
exploit primitives can hijack the control flow of the heap manager
by redirecting T to an attacker-controlled address.
To this end, Hijack locates indirect control transfers on the
current path that depend on writable memory locations using a
static dependency analysis. For simplicity, we focus on locations
that are not modified (note that aliasing does not pose a problem in
path-wise symbolic execution with a concrete memory model). If
the path does not contain an indirect control transfer, the current
path will again terminate unsuccessfully and symbolic execution
will resume with another path through the program, until an exploit
has been either found or the program is shown to be immune to
exploitation under the model used.
Hijack returns the tuple {Aval ,Ref } where Aval is the memory
location that control has been transferred to and Ref is a relative
address, such as dword ptr[edi+74h], that references the injected
buffer at the point of control transfer toAval . Such control transfers
are often observed in application-specific code, such as call tables
and C++ vtables, and also exception handling routines. It is common
practice in manual exploitation to build more reliable exploits by
making use of jmp or call trampolines [16], rather than guessing
or hardcoding memory addresses. The assumption is that a register,
which happens to contain a pointer to an attacker-controlled buffer
at the time of control being transferred to an arbitrary attacker-
chosen address, will always contain such a pointer, regardless of
the absolute value of the buffer’s memory address.
4.4 Locating a Trampoline
Subsequently, Ref is converted into a binary sequence that performs
a call or a jmp to Ref and Bounce searches for the binary sequence
in all modules that are loaded in the target process (including system
libraries such as kernel32.dll on Windows). The resulting offsets
Vval andAval are candidate values for the write-n primitive. In other
words, setting ecx to Aval and eax to Vval in a primitive such as
mov [ecx], eax is, under the chosen path, guaranteed to transfer
control toVval , which in turn, and by construction, transfers control
to an attacker-supplied buffer on the heap. To verify the suitability
of the chosen values for Vval and Aval , the constraints A = Aval
and V = Vval are added to the path condition, and, if it remains
satisfiable, the values are valid for use.
At the point of the control transfer to Aval , all eight general
purpose registers are scanned for values falling within the range of
the injected buffer. For each register r , our system also performs
a scan from dword ptr[r+00h] to dword ptr[r+FFh] to locate
indirect references to the buffer.
Finally, a working exploit requires finding memory offsets for
API functions used in the shellcode and call trampolines that
redirect control to shellcode. To that end, Bounce uses an in-vitro
scanner embedded in the guest operating system to scan modules
of interest. The list of modules is compiled from the modules that
are loaded in the target process at the point of the control flow
hijack.
4.5 Synthesis of Exploit Payload
The final phase, Payload, generates a shellcode respecting all con-
straints established in the previous phases. Given an application
containing a heap-based buffer overflow and a set of exploit-friendly
heap-interaction sequences, the generated exploit has to guide the
application towards one such sequence. In addition, the exploit
payload must cause an exploit primitive to overwrite an invoked
pointer and cause subsequent execution of arbitrary code.
Recall that a trampoline transfers control to a memory address
residing within the boundaries of the injected buffer. Hence, the
exact offset from the start of the buffer, to which control is trans-
ferred, is dependent on Ref . We shall refer to the bytes residing at
that offset as the landing site (see Figure 8). An exploit must be con-
structed within the confines of both spatial and value limitations
on the input. Since Ref transfers control to a particular offset from
the start of the injected buffer, it is mandatory to exercise control
over several bytes at the landing site. If the successive bytes are
bad bytes, this at least permits us to introduce a jmp instruction to
the rest of the shellcode. Failure to do so could cause an invalid
instruction or access violation once control reaches that part of
the buffer. In order to avoid executing bad bytes in the user input
that cannot, due to constraints, assume values of valid instructions,
we prefix all such bytes with a jmp and conveniently jump over
them. If we install shellcode as an exception handler, an invalid
instruction in the shellcode may result in an infinite loop.
The rest of the bytes that do not form part of the shellcode or
any auxiliary gadgets are set to NOP instructions in order to form
a NOP slide directed towards the shellcode. The resulting NOP slide
could be contiguous up to the shellcode or alternatively, it could
be a segmented NOP slide. The reliability of the Ref offset thus
determines the probability of successfully executing the shellcode.
We use a roughly 20-byte shellcode to run calc.exe using
WinExec and terminate the target process using ExitProcess. The
offsets of these functions, which are Service Pack-specific, are re-
trieved during Bounce and are inserted into the shellcode. We
{0x90,0x90,0x90,0x90,0x90,0x90,
0x90,0x90, landing ,0x90,0x90,
0x90,0x90,jump 2,bad,bad,0x90,
0x90,0x90,0x90,0x90,0x90,0x90
0x90,0x90,0x90, shellcode };
Figure 8: An elastic exploit template.
require two bytes for every jmp instruction that is inserted (see
Figure 8). As a consequence, a single byte located between two
bad bytes is itself considered a bad byte, as it cannot facilitate a
jump to valid code. Thus, the exploit is constructed using an elastic
shellcode template.
5 IMPLEMENTATION
We designed our system as plugins (about 5 KLOC of C++) to
the S2E binary symbolic execution framework [7]. S2E executes
code manipulating only concrete values natively and dynamically
translates symbolic code from x86 to LLVM bitcode for symbolic
execution with KLEE.
Our S2E analyzer plugin inspects program states for heap exploit
primitives. We also make use of a custom selector plugin to apply
search heuristics, such as path prioritization. In addition, we have
extended S2E plugins, such as the WindowsMonitor plugin, to work
on unsupported Windows XP service packs, e.g., SP0 and SP1. The
purpose of the extensions is merely to allow S2E to run Windows
XP SP0 and SP1 as guest operating systems and is not related to
the technique presented in this paper. We also modified KLEE’s
core modules to enable the partial processing of concolic bytes and
floating point data types. The modification proved to be crucial in
attacking the GDI component in Windows (see §6.2). In the exploit
generation phase, we produce a compact stand-alone Python script
that delivers the exploit over a chosen interface, e.g., over TCP/IP
sockets to network-enabled applications.
6 EVALUATION
In this section, we first present our evaluation targets and method-
ology (§6.1) and then present experimental results to answer the
following questions:
(1) Effectiveness (§6.2): Can our system automatically generate
heap exploits for real-world applications?
(2) Generality (§6.3): Does our system apply to a wide range of
heap managers?
(3) Automation (§6.4): What level of automation does our im-
plementation offer?
(4) Performance (§6.5): What is our system’s overall perfor-
mance and what is the contribution of the individual steps?
6.1 Evaluation Targets and Methodology
Heap Managers. As target heap managers, we selected all four
Windows XP heap managers, from Service Packs 0 to SP3, and
the open source implementations of dlmalloc (Doug Lea’s malloc)
and ptmalloc2 (the heap manager currently used in the GNU C
library, glibc). The evolution of the security of the built-in Windows
XP heap manager over the range of Service Packs is representa-
tive of the development of countermeasures across other platforms
as well. The heap vulnerabilities are not mere programming er-
rors, but complex operations on data structures which occasionally
result in unsafe program states. For example, both the Windows
heap and glibc contained unsafe unlink macros (see §2.1). Over
the years, both gradually introduced similar safety measures, e.g.,
cookies to the heap header and non-writable guard pages to prevent
cross-page overflows. For the purposes of exploit generation, each
Windows XP Service Pack represents a completely separate heap
manager, since each is a binary build with a unique set of pointer
offsets. Consequently, an exploit is tailored for deployment against
a particular Service Pack.
We also built dlmalloc and ptmalloc2 on Windows, but the
detection and use of their respective exploit primitives happens
completely inside the code of the application. While their hijack
on Windows is mediated via the UEF exception handler, a different
(possibly application-specific) function pointer can serve as a hijack
target on other platforms.
Applications. As test targets we employ two real-world closed-
source applications, WellinTech KingView and a Windows GDI
component. Both applications contain remotely exploitable heap-
based buffer overflow vulnerabilities that may lead to arbitrary code
execution. Manual exploits for both applications are available in
online security databases.
WellinTech KingView 6.53 (CVE-2011-0406) is a SCADA/HMI
application used in industrial control systems to visualize process.
It is a large and complex applications consisting of hundreds of files
and utilities. The vulnerability, which was discovered in 2011 and
given CVE-2011-0406, is present in the HistorySvr.exe module
that starts up in the background as a Windows service and listens
on TCP port 777.
The MS04-032 vulnerability is present in a core component of the
Windows operating system, the Graphics Device Interface (GDI)
library. The vulnerability is triggered when the thumbnail icon of a
specially-crafted Enhanced Metafile (.emf) image file is rendered
by an application. An attack vector would include an HTML email,
an ordinary website or a remote shared drive.
Both real-world applications were tested on Windows XP SP1
and targeted via the unlink exploit primitive. The exploit gen-
eration should therefore work successfully on any of the unsafe
unlink heap managers.
6.2 Effectiveness
We have successfully found and utilized fully-controlled write-4
primitives on Windows XP SP0 and SP1; a combination of read-4
and write-4 primitives that work in concert with each other in
dlmalloc and ptmalloc2; and partial read-4 and write-4s, fol-
lowed by an alphabet-induced write-4 (full or partial) in Windows
XP SP2 and SP3. The fact that a HeapAlloc call returns a sym-
bolic pointer during the lookaside sequence means that even API
hooks can recognize this vulnerability. In our model, we recog-
nize the vulnerability, since it results in a write primitive, due to a
trailing γ (within-bounds write) at the end of the sequence. In sum-
mary, we have verified applicability of our unlink attack sequence
on UNIX-based systems for dlmalloc 2.7.2 and glibc v2.3.3
(ptmalloc2); on Win32 systems for Windows 2000, Windows XP
SP0, and Windows XP SP1. We verified the lookaside attack on
Windows XP SP2 and SP3, and Windows 2003 Server.
Our prototype system successfully automates the entire end-
to-end process of crafting a calc-spawning exploit for the two
target applications. It demonstrates that, at least for these case
scenarios, the “hacker mind” can be imitated to a practical degree.
For a bare-bones surrogate application, full exploit generation for
an unlink vulnerability with a UEF handler hijack took 5.9 seconds;
a lookaside list exploit with app-specific hijack took 9.8 seconds.
6.3 Generality
As mentioned in §6.2, we can find and utilize fully- or partially-
controlled read and write primitives on all Windows XP Service
Packs. In dlmalloc and ptmalloc2, successfully dealing with read
is a pre-requisite for employing write primitives to hijack pointers.
Hijack Method. Our search for an invoked, writable code pointer
on Windows XP SP0 and SP1 results in finding and hijacking the
UnhandledExceptionFilter. The dlmalloc and ptmalloc2man-
agers are compromised via the samemechanism, as neither employs
its own exception handling and each passes control directly to the
UEF after an access violation. We are, however, unable to exploit
applications that preclude the execution of UEF, for example, by in-
stalling a VEH handler. The VEH exception handler is not the default
handler and its dispatch is protected from execution by a condi-
tional guard. This means the head node to its exception handler
chain cannot be found using our method.
The hijack method slightly differs for later Windows versions.
From Windows XP SP2 onward, the UEF pointer is protected by
EncodePointer, rendering the UEF hijack method infeasible. How-
ever, unlike the unlink technique, the lookaside technique allows
control flow to exit the heap manager, permitting us to search for a
hijackable pointer inside application code. Thus, to hijack applica-
tions on Windows XP SP2 and SP3, we apply the same routine that
detects the UEF dispatch to application code, automatically lifting a
valid, but non-reusable target pointer.
Memory Wrappers. Often enough, mid-sized or large software
projects, like the cross-platform Webkit, opt to employ their own
memory-management routines, usually in an effort to achieve
greater performance. We use dlmalloc and ptmalloc2 as memory
wrappers around the Windows heap. This scenario serves to show
off that our system can exploit custom heap implementations, even
if the underlying operating system heap is immune to attack. While
dlmalloc and ptmalloc2 are open source, our system does not use
their source code as an input. We are therefore able to demonstrate
that the binaries of dlmalloc and ptmalloc2 on Windows can
be executed symbolically, which is a pre-requisite for automatic
exploit generation.
Applicability. Although our evaluation is performed onWindows
XP, the exploitation techniques found and exercised by our system
are also known to be applicable to Windows 2000 SP0–SP4 and
Windows 2003 Server. This includes, at minimum, another five real-
world heap managers that our system can target without modifica-
tion. The early Windows XP versions, dlmalloc, and ptmalloc2
are all attacked using the unlink method, as it is convenient and
sufficiently powerful. Nevertheless, our techniques are not limited
to the unlink method, as shown by using the lookaside method
against later Windows XP versions that are explicitly hardened
against unsafe unlinking.
The benefits of our prototype system are most clear-cut when
an exploit, which is under construction for a newly-tasked heap
manager, differs only in minor low-level detail and is still covered
by the model in use. The extending of exploit models or templates
requires human reasoning, but minor low-level details are parsed
in a straightforward fashion by laborious, repetitive calculations,
perfectly suited for out-sourcing to a fast, automated process.
Sequence Enumeration. Designing or evolving effective heuristics
to filter out non-exploitable sequences has been left for future work.
The ascertaining of correct values for performing more complex
heap manipulations, such as repairing the default process heap
automatically, is also beyond scope. However, in all our test cases,
the path from the post-overflow invocation of the HeapAlloc or
malloc call to the execution of the exploit primitive was quite short.
Thus, while it may not qualify as a general criterion, terminating
the exploration of a sequence after 15 seconds is an effective search
heuristic for isolating the unlink and lookaside sequences.
We have conducted searches of state spaces of up to 57 config-
urations, covering just over 65,000 states, which encompass both
the unlink and lookaside exploitation techniques. Note that for
maximum speed, one should instead employ a userland fuzzer with
additional optimization steps that reduce the size of the state space.
Our search lazily explores most permutations of the alphabet, in-
cluding sequences without any θ operator. Using an S2E plugin for
searching, one complete sequence exploration takes on average 1.1
seconds, with θ interpreted as a concrete overflow.
6.4 Automation
Injection Models. As briefly mentioned in §5, in order to simulate
user input, we inject symbolic data by utilizing conventional input
vectors, such as arguments, files on disk, network transmissions
or environment variables. To this end, we implement a number of
complex interfaces, which we have observed to be necessary for the
injection of real-world applications. These complex interfaces en-
sure a target application receives the symbolic input properly. Our
plugin intercepts WSAAsyncSelect in order to retrieve the message
code and socket identifier used for the registration of asynchronous
network event notifications. The collected data is replayed into an
application’s main message loop using GetMessageA; this simulates
a network event occurrence that results either in the acceptance of
a new connection or in the reading from an established connection
stream. In the latter case, a ioctlsocket call is intercepted to sim-
ulate data waiting to be read from the operating system’s network
buffer. Only then is any subsequent attempt to read the data using
recv utilized to inject symbolic bytes.
This procedure was used to inject the WellinTech KingView
SCADA/HMI application. It is infeasible to deliver an oversized
input to KingView, and thus infeasible to exploit it, if only recv
is modeled. This demonstrates how difficult it is, in practice, to
stimulate behavior from real-world applications. It requires not
only having models for each of the four individual API calls, but
Length States Crashes Time (s) Technique
1 5 0 0
2 25 1 18
3 120 6 94
4 580 28 580 unlink
5 2,792 124 3,062
6 13,468 548 11,106
7 65,152 2,446 73,606 lookaside
Table 1: Number of states, crashes and time taken for each
step in enumerating vulnerable heap interaction sequences.
The unsafe unlinking attack is discovered after four steps,
and the lookaside vulnerability after seven.
also to have the four API calls work in concert with each other to
create a consistent illusion of incoming network traffic.
To exploit the two real-world applications, we needed to boot-
strap the symbolic execution engine with a concrete prefix and
suffix. We consider finding the path to a vulnerability to be an or-
thogonal problem, but acknowledge that it is an active research area
and an important sub-problem in a full exploit generation system.
KingView Vulnerability. To tackle the CVE-2011-0406 vulnerabil-
ity in KingView, we provided an auxiliary concrete input consisting
of 30,000 concrete bytes, with the addition of 70 symbolic bytes.
The auxiliary bytes that form the prefix are derived from a crashing
test case (without exploit). The prefix allows to reach the location
of the crash without re-exploring the entire application.
The nettransdll.dll that is host to the heap-based buffer over-
flow unfortunately computes a cyclic redundancy check (CRC16)
on received network data before passing it on. The error-checking
calculation has no effect on the exploitability of the vulnerability,
i.e., the resulting checksum does not have to match the expected
value for the exploit to work. However, the execution of the CRC16
routine itself can be problematic. A concrete prefix is often em-
ployed to get the symbolic execution engine through problematic
portions of code, e.g., an application is made to perform difficult
computations on a concrete header of a packet, so it thereafter
passes the entire packet, which bears a trailing symbolic suffix, to
the code of interest. In CVE-2011-0406, a checksum is computed on
the entire packet, resulting in a fork explosion upon the injection
of only a single symbolic byte. Cryptographic code, e.g., message
digest functions, is well-known to be problematic for symbolic exe-
cution tools. Therefore, we solve the problem by providing an S2E
abstraction for the CRC16 function with local consistency. Alter-
natively, a concolic string seeded with the concrete prefix can be
used instead. Overall, generation of a full exploit took 22 seconds.
Windows GDI Vulnerability. To generate an exploit for the MS04-
032 Windows GDI vulnerability, we provided an Enhanced Metafile
(EMF) file format template as the auxiliary concrete input. The
template consists of a 64-byte concrete prefix, the file header, and
4-byte concrete suffix, the file terminator. An arbitrary number of
symbolic bytes (in our case, 67 symbolic bytes) was injected into
the "data" portion of the EMF template by ReadFile hooks that in-
tercepted the IStream::Read interface data buffering. The control
Technique States CpuConcr CpuKlee Queries QConsts UserTime (s) QueryTime (ms) SolverTime (ms)
Unlink (SP0) 1 190,898 0 0 0 6.87 0 0
3 24,099,316 84 2 19 1.23 0.011 0.005
7 24,097,122 2,315 262 2,772 1.36 0.301 0.008
7 24,097,122 2,315 264 3,817 1.39 0.306 0.012
Lookaside (SP2) 1 231,020 0 0 0 7.48 0 0
5 50,048,788 2,073 8 86 1.80 0.017 0.018
6 50,779,813 5,266 12 146 1.90 0.020 0.029
6 54,470,030 8,892 26 1,273 2.26 0.056 0.035
6 55,675,071 8,892 27 1,322 2.43 0.059 0.038
Table 2: Number of states, executed concrete and symbolic instructions, solver queries, constructs, running time, time for
query generation, and overall solver time.
flow subsequently descended into gdiplus.dll, whereby KLEE at-
tempted to invoke the external function int32_to_floatx80 with
symbolic arguments. Recall that S2E converts translation blocks
that manipulate symbolic bytes into LLVM, for execution by KLEE.
Vanilla KLEE does not support the invocation of the external func-
tion with symbolic arguments and only had limited experimental
support for concolic data types. Thus, a few of KLEE’s Core modules
were patched to enable S2E to ingest x86 floating point operations
with concolic floating point data types. This enabled the end-to-
end construction of exploit code for MS04-032. There is reason to
suspect that future exploit systems for graphics-processing code
with an S2E back-end will demand analogous extensions. Exploit
generation took 20 seconds in this case.
6.5 Performance
All experiments were performed on a 2.5 GHz Intel Core i5 with 8
GB 1600 MHz DDR3, running a Mac OS X 10.8.5 operating system.
Table 1 shows statistics of our experiment in finding vulnerable
heap interaction sequences (Interact). The unlink and lookaside
techniques were found automatically at length 4 and 7 of the inter-
action string (see §4.1).
In Table 2, we show statistics over time for executing the unlink
technique on Windows XP SP0 and the lookaside technique on
Windows XP SP2. The number of instructions (both concrete and
symbolic) give a measurement of the size of the heap manager;
the number of queries estimates the effort required for symbolic
execution to pinpoint the exploit primitive. We also list timing
measurements for the time spent constructing queries and solving
them (using the STP solver). If a system is faced with particularly
complex constraints then this will reflect in the increase in time
that is spent generating and solving SAT queries. None of the heap
managers we tested gave rise to complex symbolic expressions,
since in neither case did the symbolic bytes go through any conver-
sion process, e.g. a hash function. This is understandable, as being
critical components of operating systems, heap managers strive
for best performance and simplicity. Therefore, the SAT queries
produced by shellcode-building code were straightforward to solve.
7 RELATEDWORK AND DISCUSSION
Automatic exploit generation tools described in academic litera-
ture [2, 6, 16] have previously tackled the problem of automating
the exploit writing pipeline for stack-based buffer overflow and
format string vulnerabilities. Due to limitations in their modeling
of security vulnerabilities, the capability of the aforementioned
systems did not extend to other classes of vulnerabilities. There is
no previous study in academic literature that tackles the problem
of synthesizing exploits for heap vulnerabilities. In [15], an input
is produced that causes a heap-vulnerable program to crash. The
result is analogous to that achieved by a fuzzer and requires no
modeling or comprehension of the heap domain, nor does it require
the selection of appropriate pointers to craft working shellcode.
While we have not previously observed any such instances, it is
conceivable to imagine a hardened heap implementation that would
pro-actively attempt to resist symbolic execution [11, 21]. Such a
defense might not hinder manual efforts to construct exploits for
heap implementations, but might present a challenge to automated
analysis and exploit-generating tools.
Our compositional approach to heap exploitation is reminiscent
of algorithms for compositional symbolic execution [1, 12]. Stan-
dard symbolic execution re-explores a procedure if two distinct
paths lead through it. In contrast, compositional symbolic execu-
tion explores procedures in isolation and combines inter-procedural
paths to form a set of realistic program paths. Since each intra-
procedural path is explored only once, the number of possible
inter-procedural paths grows linearly rather than exponentially in
the number of procedures explored [12].
The most common method for tackling the state space explosion
problem is restricting the size of the state space to be searched
(at the risk of further incompleteness). In the implementation of
existing automatic exploit generation systems [2, 6], pre-conditioned
symbolic execution is used to narrow down the target state space
to search in accordance with a chosen pre-condition. Similarly, we
use concrete prefixes in demonstrating exploit generation for our
real world targets.
Automated software testing has a variety of potential applica-
tions, which can be broadly characterized as either informative,
defensive or offensive. Informative testing discloses a bug or secu-
rity vulnerability within the program under test, most popular with
tools aimed at developers, such as as static analyzers or fuzzers. It
is often not necessary to produce a shell-spawning exploit in order
to recognize that a vulnerability is present and demands fixing. In
contrast, automated defensive and offensive solutions take action
in response to the discovery of a vulnerability. For example, an
automated patch generator [8] aims to shorten the vulnerability
window that exists from the discovery of a vulnerability to the
formulation of a patch-based fix. While some degree of automation
has been achieved in academic literature, end-to-end self-healing
software is the subject of ongoing research.
8 CONCLUSIONS
The problem of automatically synthesizing exploits for heap vul-
nerabilities has not been previously tackled. In this paper, we have
introduced the nature of heap-based vulnerabilities in the context
of the automatic exploit generation problem. We have presented a
general framework for discovering exploit primitives in heap man-
agers with varying heap layouts. Finally, we have demonstrated
that it is feasible to use our solution for real-world implementa-
tions of heap managers, and to generate working exploits for target
applications.
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